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CHANGING A LIFE INSURANCE BENEFICIARY BY WILL
INTRODUCTION

A life insurance policy and a will are two instruments of similar
character in certain respects, but dissimilar in that their validity is dependent upon different bases. Both instruments are substantially inoperative until death, and each relates to an ownership quality in the
insured or the testator. However, the power of disposition of the proceeds of a life insurance policy exists by virtue of a contract with an
insurer, whereas testamentary disposition of one's property by will is
based on a power granted by the state. The objective similarity of disposition has sparked a continuing problem in one particular aspect of
interaction between the two methods. This problem is the extent of
power in the insured to change the designated beneficiary of the life
insurance policy by means of his will.
THE GENERAL RUL.E: ITs BASIS, QUALIFICATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS'

The general rule is that the insured may not change the beneficiary
he designated in the insurance policy by means of his will. 1 This is because the powers of disposition of life insurance proceeds emanate from
contract provisions in the policy rather than the statute of wills, and
unless a change of beneficiary by will is made operative under the con1. Suga v. Suga, 35 IMI.App. 355, 182 NZE.2d 922 (1962); Stone v. Stevens, 155 Ohio
St. 595, 99 N.E.2d 766 (1951); Wannamaker v. Stroman, 167 S.C. 484, 166 SE. 621 (1932).
See W. VANCE, VANcE ON INsuRANcE 686 (3rd ed. B. Anderson 1951). See also Minnesota
Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 401 S.W. 2d 589 (Tenn. 1965). The opposite proposition was
presented in this case. The insured's estate was initially made the beneficiary of, his
life insurance policies, and the insured's will contained a provision for the disposition
of the insurance proceeds for the benefit of designated creditors. Without modification
of his will, the insured, in compliance with the policy provisions for making a change
of beneficiary, made his wife the beneficiary. The creditors contended: (1) the will
was the controlling instrument, and insured could only revoke the provision in the
will made for the creditor's benefit by a wirting in conformance with the state statute
of wills; and, (2) since a will speaks as of the time of death, the will should govern
since it tookeffect after the "attempted" change of beneficiary. The Court held that
the change of beneficiary operated as an ademption of the provision in the will, since
the insured could not directly or indirectly dispose of insurance proceeds by will so
as to defeat the rights of the named beneficiary therein.
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tract of insurance, 2 the majority of courts reject the validity of such a
change. Also, the general rule denying change of beneficiary by will
is inapplicable when the insured has named his executors, 3 his estate,4
or no one at all 5 as his beneficiary in the policy of insurance. However,
a policy obtained by the insured on his life is his property and subject
to his power to change beneficiaries if he has reserved such power,
unless such power has been contracted away 6 or made part of the terms
of a divorce decree. 7 These exceptions and qualifications are established
principles of insurance law. However, it is at this point that all essential agreement ends and conflicting principles and their corresponding
requirements begin. This split of agreement deals with the power of the
insured to make a testamentary change of beneficiary when the provisions of the policy do not expressly contemplate a testamentary
change.
THE MATTERS IN DISPUTE

The courts disallowing testamentary changes of beneficiaries often
infer the possibility of a double payment by the insurer, or at least an
invitation for litigation should the insurer pay this newly designated
beneficiary of the will.8 The opposing and better answer is that under
the present law the contesting beneficiaries invariably end up in court
litigating their rights to the proceeds of the policy anyway. Also, the
2. Martinelli v. Cometti, 133 Misc. 810, 234 N.Y.S. 389 (1929). A group insurance
policy required only "approval" by the company for a change of beneficiary. The
court held that such contention was waived by the company, and insured's will, wherein
he provided for a different beneficiary than the one designated in his policy, was given
effect; cf., United States v. Pahmer, 238 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1956). This case involved
a National Life Insurance policy, and is a typical example of the liberal construction the
Federal Courts apply to the Regulations of the Veterans' Administration with respect
to allowing an insured to make a change of beneficiary by his last will. Although the
Regulations stated that a "beneficiary designation, but not a change of beneficiary, may
be made by last will and testament duly probated," a change of beneficiary by last will
was permitted even though there was no evidence in the record to show that the will
was ever admitted to probate.
3. J. MURPHY, MURPHY'S WILL CLAUSEs 115.6 (1966).
4. See In re Shaech's Will, 252 Wis. 299, 31 N.W. 2d 614 (194g).
5. See Capers v. White, 195 Va. 1123, 81 S.E. 2d 597 (1954) (no beneficiary named
in policy, but policy contained a facility of payment clause).
6. Garabart v. Burns, 130 Tex. 518, Il S.W. 2d 1100 (1938); Adkinson v. Nearor,
243 Ala. 133, 8 So. 2d 816 (1942).
7. Dixon v. Dixon 184 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1966) (the divorce decree required decedent
to maintain and keep current with his employment all policies on his life; these policies
payable to his minor children).
8. Wannamaker v. Stroman, 167 S.C. 484, 166 S.E. 621, 623 (1932).
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insurer should have no realistic fear of double liability 9 for the usual
course under present law is for the insurer to interplead the proceeds
upon hearing of an assertion that a change of beneficiary has been made.' 0
In one case l where the insurer paid the beneficiary designated in the
policy, the beneficiary named in the will brought action against the
other beneficiary and not the insurer.
The majority of courts rely heavily on the contractual relationship
between the insured and insurer with regard to the method of changing
beneficiaries. Any deviation, they say, from the methods provided in the
policy would be too burdensome for the insurer to ascertain before
making payment.' 2 The opposing view is that these provisions are for
the protection of the insurer, not the beneficiary, 3 and without notification that change of beneficiary has been made, the insurer may pay
the designated beneficiary with impunity. 1 4 However, when the insurer has notice of a contended change of beneficiary and interpleads.
the proceeds, the previously designated beneficiary should not be able
to show a deviation from the established methods of change, since such
provisions are made for the convenience'15 and benefit of the insurer 6 or
both the insurer and the insured.17 A life insurance policy is the property
of the insured and it is he who has sacrificed his money in its maintenance. Therefore, proper weight should be given to his clear expressions of intent and desire' when examining the policy provisions
relating to changes of beneficiary.
The most controversial aspect of the changing of beneficiaries has
to do with the theory of vesting. Many of the courts, in refusing a
testamentary change of beneficiary, rely on the rule which states that
9. See Pedron v. Olds, 193 Ark. 1026, 105 S.W. 2d 70, 72 (1937).

10. See, e.g., Minnesota Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, supra note 1; Capers v. White, supra
note 5; Stone v. Stephens, supra note 1.
11. Cook v. Cook, 17 Calif. 2d 639, 111 P. 2d 322 (1941).
12. In re Ziolkowski's Will, 47 Misc. 2d 752, 263 N.Y.S. 2d 72, 73 (1965); Second

National Bank v. Dallman, 209 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1954).
13. Dixon v. Dixon, supra note 7, at 481; Rindlaub v. Travelers Ins. Co., 1190 Ohio
App. 125, 196 N.E. 2d 602, 603 (1962); United States v. Pahmer, supra note 2, at 433.
14. Pedron v. Olds, supranote 9, at 72.
15. Doss v. Kales, 94 Ariz. 247, 383 P. 2d 169 (1965).
16. Sears v. Austin, 292 F. 2d 690, 693 (9th Cir. 1961).

17. Pedron v. Olds, supra note 9, at 71; Contra, Wannamaker v. Stroman, supra note
8, at 623. (Such provisions are said to be for benefit and protection of the insurer and
the beneficiary.)
18. Stone v. Stephens, 155 Ohio St. 595, 99 NE. 2d 766, 770 (1951)

(dissent).
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upon the death of the insured, the right to the proceeds of a life
insurance policy becomes absolutely vested in the designated beneficiary. 1" Even those courts which hold that the provisions dealing
with a change of beneficiary are for the benefit of the insurer deny
a testamentary change of beneficiary because of the vesting in the
designated beneficiary. These courts maintain that although the insurer, by interpleading the proceeds, waives any conditions the contract has imposed, the insurer may not and cannot waive the vested
rights of the designated beneficiary. 20 Other courts, in disagreement,
maintain that when the insurer waives the provision requirements made
for his benefit, such requirements lose their importance, and the rights
and equities are left to the court's determination. 21 The proponents of
the attempted change rely on the intent of the insured, and hold that
his most recent expression of intent should control in light of the waiver
of the insurer.22 The majority of courts denying the efficacy of such
expression of intent insist that wills are without legal effect prior to
death.2 1 In the recent case of Suga v. Suga,24 the policy provisions dealing with change of beneficiary provided that a change was effective
upon execution of a request. Nevertheless, the Court held a request by
way of will invalid since "(t) he insurance certificate required that the
written request to change the beneficiary take effect as of the date of
execution," but the will did not take effect until death. 25 The proponents
of the testamentary change assert the immateriality of the will's legally
speaking at death. They view the will as an expression of intent during
the lifetime of the insured-testator, and an important expression; for it
has been stated that "... . a will is of much more convincing import as
to the intentions of the insured than any informal writings or expressions
of desire would be." 26
19. Carter v. First National Bank, 185 So. 361, 363 (Ala. 1938); Cook v. Cook, supra
note 11, at 327; Stone v. Stephens, supra note 18, at 769; Young v. American Standard
Life Ins. Co., 398 IMI.565, 76 N.E. 2d 501 (1947).
20. Dogariu v. Dogariu, 306 Mich. 392, 11 N.W. 2d 1 (1943); Davenport v. Bankers
Life Co., 178 Neb. 591, 134 N.W. 2d 250, 261 (1965); Bales v. Croom, 400 S.W. 2d 261,

264 (Tenn. 1964).
21. In re Wolfe's Will, 47 Misc. 2d 124, 262 N.Y.S. 2d 5 (1965).

22. Stone v. Stephens, supra note 18, at 770 (dissent); Pedron v. Olds, supra note 9,
at 72.

23. Cook v. Cook, supra note 11, at 327.
24. 35 Ill. App. 355, 182 N.E. 2d 922 (1962).
25. Id. at 924.
26. Stone v. Stephens, supra note 22, at 777 (dissent).
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One very convincing argument given by the courts in refusing a
testamentary change of beneficiary is that public policy requires that
life insurance proceeds be paid as promptly as possible to a beneficiary
after the death of the insured. Therefore, the insurer should pay the
beneficiary designated in the policy, because allowing changes of beneficiary other than by means firmly established in the contract would
open the door to uncertainty as to the beneficiary in each life insurance
policy where the insured has retained the right to change the beneficiary.27 The basis of this view is possibly the not illogical inference
that the beneficiary in all probability is of such a close relationship as
to be saddled with the burial expenses of the insured. However, a type
of life insurance which precludes delay through litigation by prompt
payment through means of a "facility of payment clause" already exists in
the form of Industrial Life Insurance. 28 Those people desirous of such
protection should be encouraged to invest in this type of policy. The
fact remains that an ordinary life insurance policy with a right reserved
to make a change of beneficiary is the property of the insured since it
was he who paid the premiums that kept the policy in force. Surely his
9
manifestation of intent should have great weight!
UNDERLYING REASONS FOR THE UNCERTAINTY IN THE

LAw

Aside from the above reasons upon which the courts rely to allow
or disallow a testamentary change of beneficiary, there exists underlying
causes for the wide diversity in the decisions. One cause, succincdy
stated, is that in the area of law concerning the changing of beneficiaries
without strict compliance with policy provisions, "the courts appear
to weigh heavily the equities of the adverse claimants." 10 A survey of
the various cases will show that the courts scrutinize the relationship
of the claimants to the insured, 3' and where a court feels that the insured
labored under a gross mistake, it may ignore precedent to achieve a just
27. Wannamaker v. Stroman, supra note 8, at 623. It is interesting to note that this
expression of the need for prompt payment occurred in a proceeding decided at the
height of the Depression.
28. W. VANCE, VANCE ON INSURANCE 698-702 (3rd ed. B. Anderson 1951). The contract

authorizes payment by the insurer to any person the insurer feels to be equitably entitled to the proceeds by reason of burial expenses.
29. Sears v. Austin, 292 F.2d 690, 693 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. Pahmer, 238
F. 2d 431 (2d Cir. 1956).

SO. VANcE, op. cit. supranote 28, at 684.
31. See Wannamaker v. Stroman, 167 S.C. 484, 166 SE. 621, 622 (1932).

Here the

South Carolina Court was called upon to allow a change of beneficiary by will, and
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result.3 2 Such observations may also indicate that other courts may
consciously or even subconsciously reach their conclusions on the basis
of facts and circumstances which do not even reach the record, or,
reaching the record, are matters not seemingly thrown into the scales of
determination.
Another cause for the uncertainty and confusion surrounding the
area of law dealing with changes of life insurance beneficiaries by
will arises in the wording of the insurance policy provisions. The
expressly approved methods of change vary not only with the companies, but with the type of policy.33 Formerly, ordinary life insurance
contracts predominated in the form of "old line policies." These contracts reserved no power in the insured to make a change of beneficiary,
the plaintiffs relied upon Hunter v. Hunter, 100 S.C. 517, 84 S.E. 180 (1915), where the
court had allowed a testamentary change of beneficiary. The court refused to follow
Hunter and said:
* * * [Tihat the distinction in part was that the former case was one of tragic
calamity; the insured was shot by the paramour of his wife as he was entering
his own home to their surprise, and he died the following day after having made
a will bequeathing the proceeds of an insurance policy which had been payable
to the unfaithful wife to his mother.
32. See In re Wolf's Will, 47 Misc. 2d 124, 262 N.Y.S. 2d 5, 7 (1965). The designated
beneficiary of insured's policy was a bank as trustee of a trust created by his will.
Insured revoked his will but never named a new beneficiary under the policy since
he must have thought that his wife, as a prior beneficiary, was reinstated. The Court
stated the general rule requiring compliance with the policy provisions to change a
beneficiary. Nevertheless, the Court made an exception by saying:
The provisions regarding the changing of beneficiaries are solely for the
benefit of the insurer, and when they are waived by the carrier's withdrawing
from the proceedings . . ., the insured's failure to comply with such provision
is not controlling and the rights and equities of the [claimants] must be left
to court's determination regardless of such failure ....
33. Sears v. Austin, supra note 29, at 691-692 (federal employee's group life policy;
..proper form secured from the U.S. Civil Service Commission."); Wannamaker v.
Stroman, supra note 31, at 621 (whole-or ordinary life; ". . upon return of policy to
insurer with insured's written request."); Carter v. First National Bank, 185 So. 361
(Ala. 1938) (whole-or ordinary life; ".

.

. filing with the company a written request,

accompanied by... policy, such change to take effect when endorsed by the Company.");
Suga v. Suga, 35 Ill. App. 355, 182 N.E. 2d 922, 923 (1962) (employee's group life; " ..
by written request filed at Home Office .... Such change to take effect as of date of
execution of such request, whether or not employee be living at the time of such filing.);
Rindlaub v. Travelers Ins. Co., 1190 Ohio App. 125, 192 N.E. 2d 602, 606 (1962) (whole
-or

ordinary life; ".

.

. effective only when such change shall have been approved in

writing by the company."); Parks' Ex'rs. v. Park, 288 Ky. 435, 156 S.W. 2d 480, 482
(1941) (whole-or ordinary life; " .. by filing notice thereof at the Home Office and
such change shall take place upon such filing and not before."); Dogariu v. Dogariu,
306 Mich. 392, 11 N.W. 2d 1, 3 (1943) (whole-or ordinary life; "No change in this
policy shall be valid unless approved by an executive officer of the company, and such
approval be endorsed hereon.").
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and the designated beneficiary acquired a vested interest therein. 34 Presumably, a designated beneficiary's vested interest was subject to divestment only by the failure of the insured to pay the premiums. However,
when insurance companies made the transition from "old line policies"
to that type of policy prevalent today, where the insured may reserve
the right to change beneficiaries, stringent methods of effectuating such
change were required. Typical requirements are the return of the
policy to the insurer, with the insured's written request, the change being
of no effect until the insurer made a notation thereof on the policy itself.35 These harsh rules, primarily made for the purpose of protecting
the companies from double payment, have had no little influence in
bringing about the harsh rules in many of the jurisdictions in litigation
concerning the testamentary change of beneficiaries.36
More recently, however, the requirements for a change of beneficiary
have been greatly relaxed. The common requirements are merely some
sort of written notification to the insurer of a request to change the
beneficiary, and some policies also require the "approval" of the insurer.3 7 This relaxation may have been brought about by the interest
of the life insurance business to improve the marketability of their
product; or, the protection provided by interpleader may have encouraged the insurance companies to be more lenient in the provisions
for a change of beneficiary. No matter what the cause of this liberalization of procedure may be, the insurance companies must be less fearful
of double payment at the present time. Regardless of the liberalization
of procedure for making a beneficiary change, the courts interpret a
policy provision for the making of a change to be an exclusive method,
,even where the contract is hazy or unclear.3 8
The shibboleth of the majority of the courts in determining whether
a change of beneficiary has been properly effectuated is "substantial compliance" 31 with the policy provisions. The test of "substantial com34. 2 APPLE AN, iNSURANCE LAw Sec. 901, 443, n. 15 (1966).
35. Supra note 33 (examples of the stringent requirements: Wannamaker v. Stroman,

Carter v. First National Bank).
36. See, e.g., Wannamaker v. Stroman, supra note 33.
37. Supra note 33 (examples of the more liberal requirements: Suga v. Suga, Rindlaub v. Travelers Ins. Co., Parks' Ex'rs v. Park).
38. VANcE, op. cit. supra note 28, at 685, citing Parks' Ex'rs v. Park, supra note 33;
Dogariu v. Dogariu, supra note 33.
39. Zervas v. Zervas, 338 F. 2d 299 (8th Cir. 1964); Shenandoah Life Ins. Co. v.
Harvey, 242 F. Supp. 680, 683 (D. Md. 1965); Boles v. Croom, 400 S.W. 2d 261, 262
(Tenn. 1964).
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pliance" has been defined either as a requirement that the insured has
40
done everything reasonably within his power to effect such a change
or that a change will be given effect if all that remains to be done is a
ministerial duty on the part of the insurer.41 It should be noted, however,
that in policies calling for "filing," "approval," "written notice," or indeed endorsement by the insurer, the insurer cannot prevent a change
by failure or refusal to act.42 Therefore, if notification to the insurer
by way of will can be held to constitute adequate notification to the
insurer, it should follow as a natural consequence that nothing remains
to be done on the part of the insurer except a ministerial act.
As should be apparent, uniformity of rules and methods in making
changes of beneficiary has been absent in both the court applications
of the law and in the procedures required by the insurance contracts.
Some courts maintain that their rules are well-settled, 43 but exceptions
can be found where the courts had to exercise some of their equitable
powers to bring about a justifiable result. 44 The fact remains that not
all laymen know of the conflicting court decisions, and many seek to
make testamentary dispositions of their life insurance proceeds. Thus,
in many instances, the final disposition of the proceeds is contrary to
the express intentions of the insured when the courts refuse to accept
4
his method of change. 1
A PROPOSED SOLUTION

A remedy is necessary not only to bring uniformity into that area
of law dealing with the changing of life insurance beneficiaries, but to
give a keener respect to the intentions of the policy owner. The contractual relationship between the insurer and the insured remains very
relevant, but it must be remembered that a life insurance contract is a
contract of adhesion. Also, the only valid interest an insurer should
40. Acacia Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Feinberg, 318 Miss. 246, 61 N.E. 2d 122 (1945);
O'Connell v. Brady, 136 Conn. 475,72 A. 2d 493 (1950).
41. Lundeen v. Cordner, 354 F. 2d 401 (8th Cir. 1966); Luhrs v. Luhrs, 123 N.Y. 367,

25 N.E. 888 (1890); Brajowich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 189 Minn. 123, 248 NAV.
711,713 (1933).

42. Boles v. Croom, supra note 39, at 264; Rindlaub v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra note
33, at 606-607.
43. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hoyer, 211 N.Y.S. 2d 21, 23 (1961); Wannamaker v.

Stroman, supra note 33.
44. See, In re Wolfe's Will, supra note 32; Hunter v. Hunter, supra note 31.
45. See, e.g., In re Ziolkowsld's Will, 47 Misc. 2d 752, 263 N.Y.S. 2d 72 (1965); Suga
v. Suga, supra note 33; Bowman v. Bowman, 3 Ohio Misc. 161, 210 N.E. 2d 920 (1965).
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have with respect to a beneficiary is the guarantee that the insurer will
not have to pay two of them. The existing approaches to the problem
have proved unsatisfactory. The courts pay little or no heed to the
intent of the insured. Even in the face of the complete disinterest of
the insurer as to which beneficiary should receive the proceeds, the
courts require close conformity to the policy provisions. These requirements must be met no matter how unclear the policy provisions are.
Even if the will can be said to fulfill the requirement of notification, the
courts nevertheless refuse to acknowledge the effectiveness of the will
with respect to the insurance proceeds. These majority courts will only
give effect to the insured's testamentary change of beneficiary when it
suits their purpose to punish an unfaithful beneficiary or to correct a
glaring mistake of the insured.
Standardization of the policy provisions for making a change of beneficiary would be a step in the right direction in the search of a solution
to the problem. Such uniformity could be the result of legislative or
administrative proscription, or concerted action among the insurance
companies themselves.46 This would not be a proscription of the entire
policy, as is the case of the very successful Standard Fire Policy which
has been adopted in almost every state,47 since the purposes for which
life insurance contracts are made are too divergent.48 However, the
provisions for a change of beneficiary in those policies in which the insured has reserved such power could be made more convenient, while at
the same time creating uniformity. Such a uniform provision should
enable the insured to change beneficiaries by way of his will, especially
in view of the fact that the policy provisions often remain unread by
the ordinary laymen-insured, 49 and the will is the method by which
these people most often seek to effectuate a change of beneficiary not
in exact conformance with the policy provisions. To prevent an unintentional change, it should be required that a clear expression of intent
be shown with reference to a specific policy. This would be necessary
to prevent assertions that a general power of appointment or even the
"catch-all" residuary clause has constituted a change of beneficiary. In
any event, the insurer would continue to be protected by interpleader,
and, it should be established in the policy that the insurer is immune from
suit if it should pay the prior beneficiary before any notification of a
46.
47.
48.
49.

R.

KErEToN, BASIC INSURANCF

VANCE, supra note 28, at 58.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 60.

LAW 58-60.
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change of beneficiary by will. As a result, any litigation concerning a
testamentary change of beneficiary would continue to be between the
beneficiaries. It is hoped that litigation would be minimized with such
a provision because the broader delineation of the methods of change
would be apparent to the parties.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is evident that the problems relating to a testamentary
disposition of life insurance proceeds are complicated and varied. Although liberalization of the methods required to effect a change of beneficiary has accompanied the development of life insurance policies as they
exist today, the old harsh rules and their rationales have been retained.
These rules existed predominantly for the protection of the insurer and
insured rather than the beneficiary. Now, however, the insurer is protected by interpleader, and the protection provided for the insured
should not be used against him. More emphasis must be given to the
most recent and clear manifestation of intent of the insured, for it is he
who owned the policy and kept it operative. A standardization and
liberalization of the contract provisions relating to the change of beneficiaries would improve the existing inequities.

Thomas C. Clark

